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ABSTRACT
Web applications continue to remain as the most popular method of interaction for
businesses over the Internet. With it’s simplicity of use and management, they of-
ten function as the ”front door” for many companies. As such, they are a critical
component of the security ecosystem as vulnerabilities present in these systems could
potentially allow malicious users access to sensitive business and personal data.
The inherent nature of web applications enables anyone to access them anytime
and anywhere, this includes any malicious actors looking to exploit vulnerabilities
present in the web application. In addition, the static configurations of these web
applications enables attackers the opportunity to perform reconnaissance at their
leisure, increasing their success rate by allowing them time to discover information
on the system. On the other hand, defenders are often at a disadvantage as they do
not have the same temporal opportunity that attackers possess in order to perform
counter-reconnaissance. Lastly, the unchanging nature of web applications results in
undiscovered vulnerabilities to remain open for exploitation, requiring developers to
adopt a reactive approach that is often delayed or to anticipate and prepare for all
possible attacks which is often cost-prohibitive.
Moving Target Defense (MTD) seeks to remove the attackers’ advantage by re-
ducing the information asymmetry between the attacker and defender. This research
explores the concept of MTD and the various methods of applying MTD to secure
Web Applications. In particular, MTD concepts are applied to web applications
by implementing an automated application diversifier that aims to mitigate specific
classes of web application vulnerabilities and exploits. Evaluation is done using two
open source web applications to determine the effectiveness of the MTD implementa-
tion. Though developed for the chosen applications, the automation process can be
customized to fit a variety of applications.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Static System Configurations: Conventional System Configurations
Current approaches to security assume that a systems’ configuration remains static
over long periods of time. This enables the attacker to have two key advantages over
the defender: The ability to perform system reconnaissance over a period of time
undetected and the ability to develop exploits based on the information gathered
and execute them on their own time. Moving Target Defense seeks to remove this
advantage by changing system configurations over time. Chapter 2 discusses MTD
further, providing background and related work.
Web applications continue to be the most widely used method for businesses
to conduct services over the Internet. Too often, sensitive business and user data
is managed and processed by these web applications. As such, vulnerabilities in
these systems pose a serious threat to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of business and user data. Existing tools and techniques focus on identifying and
preventing these vulnerabilities. However, due to the increasing complexity of modern
web applications and their slow deployment time, they are often ineffective. To
address these issues, Moving Target Defense can be leveraged in order to provide
another layer of defense. Chapter 3 further discusses the modern web application
architecture and its vulnerabilities leading to Chapter 4, where a discussion of current
techniques followed by an exploration in related work of Moving Target Defense in
web applications is done.
1
1.2 Research Approach
A study was done on current Moving Target Defense techniques in order to gain
an understanding of its goals and challenges and identify the composition of Moving
Target Defense (What to Move, When to Move, Limitations, and evaluation tech-
niques). In order to develop a Moving Target Defense system applicable to Web
Applications, we dissect the structure of web application to identify its components
and the vulnerabilities possible for each component. Doing so allows for identifica-
tion of configurations that can be ‘moved‘, in addition to identifying the limitations of
applying Moving Target Defense in specific configurations. Furthermore, some work
was done in designing effective movement policies in order to maximize the security
of web applications
1.3 Limitations
The proposed technique is applicable to any language, but since we utilize application-
specific ’shims’ that have to be developed manually, scalability issues might arise de-
pending on the amount of ’shims’ to create. A collection of these existing ’shims’
might alleviate this problem but having such application specific code publicly avail-
able renders the technique ineffective as malicious users would also have the same
information available to them. The proposed method is also limited in prevention of
specific attacks and would best be used with other defense techniques in a layered
approach.
1.4 Contributions
In summary, the main contributions expected to be explained in this work are:
• A generalized MTD framework that can be applied to any web application to
2
any layer
• An implementation of an automated language and database translator that
enables source and dialect randomization for web applications.
• Application of MTD to open source web applications using source and dialect
randomization and their effectiveness.
3
Chapter 2
MOVING TARGET DEFENSE BACKGROUND
2.1 Introduction to Moving Target Defense
Moving Target Defense (MTD) seeks to level the asymmetric environment of at-
tacker and defender by negating any advantages the attacker has. In order to ac-
complish this goal, MTD seeks to control change across various system dimensions
to increase uncertainty, complexity, and cost for attackers Cyberspace (2011). With
the assumption that perfect security is difficult to obtain, MTD focuses on enabling
resilient, defensible systems that allow continued, safe operation in a compromised
environment rather than developing perfectly secure systems. In addition, MTD does
not remove vulnerabilities directly, rather, it reduces the attack window by limiting
the temporal exposure of vulnerabilities.
Two approaches in creating such a defensible system are: disrupting reconnais-
sance efforts of the attacker or disrupting on-going attacks. For both MTD ap-
proaches, they aim to invalidate any information on the system that an attacker had
managed to acquire previously.
2.2 Challenges in Moving Target Defense
There are several main challenges in developing efficient and effective MTD sys-
tems:
• Ensuring that legitimate users have continued access to the service
• Ensuring that the MTD technique introduces minimal cost (in terms of delay
and resource consumption) to the system
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• Ensuring that the MTD technique provides benefit when introduced to the
system
2.3 Related Work
The idea and philosophy of MTD, which is to increase uncertainty and complexity
for attackers, has been proposed and studied for decades Avizienis and Chen (1977);
Ammann and Knight (1988); Pettis and Hansen (1990); Forrest et al. (1997).
Okhravi et al. surveyed techniques that applied the philosophy of MTD in different
cyber research domains Okhravi et al. (2013). According to them, existing techniques
can be categorized into five classes based on what component to move:
1. Changing the application environment Team (2003); Barrantes et al. (2003)
2. Changing application code dynamically or diversifying software Wartell et al.
(2012); Larsen et al. (2014)
3. Changing the representation of data Ammann and Knight (1988); Nguyen-
Tuong et al. (2008)
4. Changing the properties of platforms Williams et al. (2009); Salamat et al.
(2011)
5. Changing the network configurations Zhuang et al. (2013); Ge et al. (2014);
Jafarian et al. (2012)
Application environment randomization involves modifying the environment pre-
sented to the application by the system at run-time. These techniques modify config-
uration components such as data and instruction memory locations, heap/stack con-
figuration, and the application’s instruction set. Techniques that fall within this cate-
gory typically prevent injection-attacks that seek to control the application by inject-
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ing malicious code or otherwise. Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Team
(2003) and Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) are widely adopted instances of ap-
plication environment randomization in modern operating systems. Existing ASLR
mechanisms randomly arrange the address space positions of key data areas such as
the base executable memory location, application stack and heap, and any libraries it
requires. (what-to-move) of a process when it is launched (when-to-move), including
the base of the executable and the positions of the stack, heap, and libraries. As a
result, if an attacker manages to exploit some memory corruption vulnerability in the
application binary, i.e. a buffer overflow attack, it would be difficult for attackers to
transfer control flow to their injected code as they will be unable to accurately predict
the application’s memory layout.
Dynamic application code or code diversification involves techniques that change
the application code dynamically, for instance techniques include modifying project
instructions or having different, multiple versions of the application (hence diversity).
The authors in Okhravi et al. (2013) cite Proactive Obfuscation as one example
technique wherein they create multiple copies of the service randomized differently -
that is, semantically different but functionally equivalent applications. Whenever a
request to the service is issued, it is sent to each service replica and responses from
each are calculated and the majority vote is the response that is sent out.
Dynamic data representation is similar to dynamic application code or code di-
versification, but instead of having multiple variants of the application code being
analyzed, multiple variants of the application data is monitored instead. It does so
by having multiple copies of the application wherein each replica handles the data
passed differently - any variants or divergence among the services is then detected
and alerts the administrator of malicious behavior.
Dynamic platform techniques involve any change within the platform properties
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of the system - OS version, CPU Architecture, OS Instance, etc. Multi variant
Execution is one example of this technique wherein multiple varieties of the service is
executed in lockstep. While the applications run identically in normal behavior, each
service replica operates differently while under attack. These inconsistencies are then
monitored and reported once detected in order to signify an ongoing attack.
Dynamic network techniques primarily involve changing the properties of the net-
work dynamically, some examples include protocols, ports, and addresses. Some well
known techniques include IP Randomization Jafarian et al. (2014, 2012) and Port
Randomization Luo et al. (2014). Dynamic network techniques often focus on dis-
rupting the reconnaissance effort of the attacker in that the IP address, traffic, or
open ports revealed are changed in order to delay their information gathering.
In all five of their proposed categories, each technique involves identifying anoma-
lous behavior and alerting the user or administrator of the suspected activity. How-
ever, determining if the action taken is anomalous or not is difficult due to the pos-
sibility of false positives and false negatives, compounded by the unpredictable and
ever-changing actions of human attackers. Therefore their exists the research chal-
lenge of developing an effective intrusion detection and anomaly detection system to
address the dynamically changing actions of attackers in order to separate legitimate
traffic from suspicious and malicious traffic.
2.4 Dynamic Network Techniques
Research in the area of Network-Based MTD techniques are plentiful and involve
techniques that modify the end-host communications to techniques that modify the
actual network infrastructure. As with any approach, they all involve trade-offs and
challenges. In network-based MTD, the difficulty of identifying legitimate and mali-
cious users become more prominent as traffic sent by both are similar to each other -
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malicious actions being easily identified during the attack phase. In addition, intro-
ducing a MTD technique to the system may inadvertently cause a bottleneck, creating
an unintended weak point for Denial of Service attacks - denying legitimate users ac-
cess to the service itself. Finally, the problem of scalability becomes a greater focus
due to constantly changing business requirements and the varying network require-
ments of each organization. There are five general categories that existing network
based MTD techniques can fall under: Port Randomization, Traffic Morphing, Dy-
namic Network Address Translation, and Network Address Space Randomization.
2.4.1 Port Randomization
Port Hopping Luo et al. (2014, 2015) is a technique that constantly modifies the
port number in order to prevent reconnaissance attacks on a service. It allows one to
hide service identities thereby confuses attackers to the real location of each service.
However, the data contained in relevant work shows that Port Hopping is effective
mostly in systems that contain few vulnerabilities and a large number of ports. In
addition, port hopping seems to be only effective during the reconnaissance phase of
attacks, as once an attacker manages to get in the system, changing the port would
not matter as much due to being able to keep track of changes.
2.4.2 Traffic Morphing
Traffic Morphing Li et al. (2014) is a technique that involves hiding the intended
packet within typical network traffic in order to prevent successful traffic analysis.
The technique is primarily used by Cyber-Physical Messages in order to satisfy the
real-time constraints of Cyber Physical Systems. Experimental results of the research
reveal that the proposed technique achieves moderate overhead to the system while
successfully morphing the messages with typical network traffic during real-time.
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2.4.3 Dynamic Network Address Translation
Dynamic Network Address Translation Kewley et al. (2001); Michalski et al.
(2002) works by hiding/obfuscating the hosts’ identity located with each packet
header when it is sent over the public Internet. This delays and introduces con-
fusion to the attacker by hiding what is occurring within the network, however not
all applications can work with address translation, in addition to the overhead costs
that get added to each connection.
2.4.4 Network Address Space Randomization
Network Address Space Randomization Antonatos et al. (2005) primarily involves
hosts forcibly changing their IP addresses by requesting to requesting a new address
from the DHCP server. This technique is supported by different desktops and operat-
ing systems. However, the technique requires constant resource requests and changes
to the OS on each end host, thereby increasing the deployment cause.
To address the issue of service availability to legitimate users, Crosb et. al. Crosby
et al. (2013) analyzed the the network interdependencies of Moving Target Defense
Systems and proposed a layered approach in viewing interdependencies between layers
in order to develop tools and techniques that allow continuous service to legitimate
users. In their layered approach, they suggested to make ’corrections’ or changes to
the same layer or a higher layer where the randomization occurs to perform mitigation.
For example in Figure 2.1, if IP randomization, Layer 3, was the chosen MTD
technique to deploy, the mitigation strategy for legitimate users should be done at
a higher level such as Layer 7. At the same time however, any changes done at any
layer might have an effect on the lower layer dependencies.
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Figure 2.1: OSI Layers
In order to support the idea of network-based MTD solutions, Ge et. al. Green
et al. (2015) proposed a generic framework for MTD by introducing a service layer
between users and servers in order to avoid exposure of actual servers. Figure 2.2
shows their proposed MTD framework, wherein a proxy server authenticates users
and assigns each legitimate user to a proxy node. The proxy node then maps and
relays communication between the users and the actual servers. In this way, the
servers true identity is not revealed to the users due the proxy nodes functioning as
communication relays. In addition, only authenticated users would be allowed access
to the proxy nodes, reducing the chance of unauthorized access to the services.
They also identify several seven key properties that are common to network based
MTD techniques that ensures their effectiveness in addition to identifying common
components among the approaches. According to them, there are four main compo-
nents in network-based MTD:
• Clients are hosts that are trying to access the service that is protected by the
10
Figure 2.2: MTD Framework proposed by Ge et al. (2014)
MTD system. They are divided into two types:
– Trusted Clients are clients that are not deemed malicious and follow typical
actions toward the service.
– Untrusted Clients are clients that have not been granted access to the
service.
A client can be considered trusted once it has been granted access to the service.
• Target is the service or destination that is protected by the MTD system.
• Sink is destination for untrusted clients which can be an unroutable destination
or simply a honeypot for monitoring.
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Figure 2.3: NMTD components
• Mapping System is the component that identifies and classifies clients as au-
thorized or not.
Figure 2.3 from Green et. al illustrates the components of network MTDs and how
they interact with each other.
In order to accomplish the goals of MTD, three main properties have been iden-
tified:
• Moving Property which forces clients to follow the mapping system component
in order to reach the protected target and limits the attack surface of any
untrusted clients. Three additional sub-properties have been identified in order
to fulfill this property:
– Unpredictability, which guarantees that the MTD system moves the targets
in an unpredictable fashion in such a way that clients are unable to guess
the location of any target unless they are authorized to do so.
– Vastness, which guarantees that the movement space of the MTD system
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is large enough such that it would be difficult for clients to exhaustively
search the entire space.
– Periodicity, which guarantees that the targets are moved regularly in such
a way that any information gleaned by untrusted clients are rendered void
quickly.
• Access Control Property requires that clients are only able to reach their target
if and only if they are authorized by the mapping system. Three additional
sub-properties have been identified to fulfill this property:
– Uniqueness guarantees that every client is authorized individually and in
such a way that authorization is restricted to that client.
– Availability guarantees that each client authorized to a target will be able
to successfully reach the target when required - the MTD technique must
ensure that no DoS vulnerabilities are introduced.
– Revocability ensures that the mapping system component is capable of
termination or revoking any prior authorization to a client with affecting
other clients or system components.
• Distinguishability Property ensures that the MTD system is capable of identi-
fying trustworthy clients vs. untrustworthy clients. In order to do so, charac-
teristics unique to trustworthy clients must be identified in order to determine
which clients to authorize.
As observed from the techniques categorized above, Network-Based MTD tech-
niques seem to be effective during the reconnaissance phase of attackers due to the
nature of network configurations - IP Addresses and Port Numbers, in comparison to
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Application-Based MTD approaches where dynamic randomization is possible in or-
der to thwart ongoing attacks, for example introducing randomness to SQL queries in
such a way that attackers are unable to correct guess the syntax of the query. In order
to be truly effective, Network-Based MTD should be incorporated into the Defense-In-
Depth approach of current Network Security practices. Furthermore, Network-Based
MTD approaches are restricted in the ’moving’ aspect of MTD due to the reliance
on two components: Intrusion/Anomaly detection in order to identify anomalous or
suspicious traffic and reliance on an authentication service in order to identify users
or hosts that are authorized to access the service.
Intrusion detection and anomaly detection is a problematic approach due to the
fact that it is restricted in scope. For instance, anomaly-based and signature-based
detection systems are often prone to misclassification of data and high error rates. In
addition, most successful attacks are sophisticated and complex in that they do not
follow a predetermined pattern or that the malicious operator behind it modifies the
attack in such a way that previously known patterns will fail. In the time it takes
to update the information on the exploit, attackers would have already attempted
and executed the exploit - making any response taken against attackers a reactive
approach rather than MTD’s fundamental concept of proactive approch. The use of
authenticated users and hosts is also disadvantageous primarily due to its inflexible
approach - although keeping track of each user and restricting access to those that
have been authenticated reduces the probability of unauthorized access, scaling such
MTD techniques to use larger networks, i.e. public internet access, is difficult due
the large number of potential users. In addition, there is still the possibility of insider
attacks or malicious users impersonating authenticated users.
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Static and Dynamic MTD techniques In addition to the 5 classes of MTD
techniques, each class can be further categorized. For instance, MTD mechanisms for
programs can be categorized into two classes depending on if a program is running
(dynamic) or not (static) at the time when moving happens. For instance, existing
ASLR approaches are static, because the positions of code and data areas are only
moved at the launch of a program but not when a program is running. On the other-
hand, dynamic MTD techniques offer a wider option of choices for when-to-move,
in exchange for being more difficult to implement due to other considerations: i.e.
overhead cost and downtime during movement.
2.5 Key Challenges to Moving Target Defense
We have identified three key challenges in developing MTD systems, a brief ex-
planation of each is provided below.
Ensure availability to legitimate users while disrupting attackers A big
challenge in developing MTD systems is to ensure system availability to legitimate
users while disrupting attackers. When changing system configurations or moving
components, services to users should be undisturbed. Malicious users on the other
hand, often attempt to use or access the system in unintended methods by exploiting
vulnerabilities present. By changing the system configuration, legitimate users would
still have unimpeded access to the service as they continue to use it in its intended
way; on the other hand, malicious users attempts to exploit vulnerabilities would be
disrupted as they rely on the previous system configuration.
System design must provide the intended security benefits (attack sur-
face must reduced) In developing MTD systems, specific exploits are prevented
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by changing certain components such that vulnerabilities leading to the exploits are
unavailable. However, in doing so, developers must be careful that changing configu-
rations does not introduce new vulnerabilities
Development of secure control system that handles Moving Target Defense
system In complex MTD systems, the main logic handler needs to be secure. If
MTD logic is compromised, the entire system is rendered null as malicious users will
have knowledge of the new configuration as soon as it is available resulting in any
configuration changes inefficient in increasing uncertainty for the attacker.
Scalability of MTD Technique As with most security techniques, MTD should
be practical to use and therefore easy to scale with most systems.
2.6 Moving Target Defense Framework
Four components have been identified in defining MTD systems:
1. MTD Technique (What-to-Move), which identifies the component(s) to be mod-
ified in order to introduce complexity to attackers. These components can vary
from identities within networks to physical devices.
2. MTD Approach (When-to-Move), which describes the logic used in deciding
when and how often to modify the configuration. Various methods have been
proposed ranging from pseudo-random to game-theoretic approaches to nature-
inspired algorithms.
3. Applications of MTD, which identifies the area the MTD system is applicable
to - hindering reconnaissance efforts or protect against unwanted modification
and analysis.
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4. Evaluation methods, which defines the methods used to determine whether the
technique is ’effective’ - researchers have proposed differing definitions of effec-
tiveness such as successfully defending against a specific attack vs. hindering
or disrupting reconnaissance efforts of an attacker.
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Chapter 3
WEB APPLICATIONS
3.1 Web Applications: Individual and Commercial Front Doors
Web applications continue to remain as the most popular method for businesses
to conduct services over the Internet. As the number of web applications that are
accessible increase, so too does the amount of sensitive business and user data that is
managed and processed by web applications. Because of their continuously increasing
popularity and their inherent nature, vulnerabilities that are present in these web
applications put both businesses and end-users’ security and privacy at risk.
This is not an abstract risk, as the JPMorgan Chase breach in 2014 affected
76 million US households Silver-Greenberg et al. (2014). Bloomberg reported that
the hackers “exploited an overlooked flaw in one of the bank’s websites” Robertson
and Riley (2014). Therefore, web applications serve as the “front door” for many
companies and ensuring their security is of paramount importance.
Current techniques and tools focus primarily on prevention and discovery of these
vulnerabilities. For instance, many techniques and tools using static analysis (white-
box) or dynamic analysis (black-box) approaches have been proposed and developed
to discover the vulnerabilities of web applications Balzarotti et al. (2008); Felmetsger
et al. (2010); Jovanovic et al. (2010); Doupe´ et al. (2012, 2013), so that the vulnerabil-
ities can be removed before attackers discover and exploit them. However, the efforts
of discovering and fixing vulnerabilities are not enough to protect web applications
for many reasons:
1. The increasing complexity of modern web applications brings inevitable risks
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that cannot be fully mitigated in the process of web application development
and deployment
2. Attackers are able to take their time in understanding the target web applica-
tion’s functionality and underlying technology stack before executing an attack.
We believe that a defense-in-depth approach is best in securing web applications.
Therefore, to complement the aforementioned vulnerability analysis techniques, we
propose to use the ideas of Moving Target Defense to create a novel and proactive
approach that adds an additional layer of defense to web applications. At a high
level, a Moving Target Defense dynamically configures and shifts systems over time
to increase the uncertainty and complexity for attackers to perform probing and at-
tacking Cui and Stolfo (2011); Zhuang et al. (2014). While a system’s availability is
preserved to legitimate users, the system components are changed in unpredictable
ways to the attackers. Therefore, the attacker’s window of attack opportunities de-
crease and the costs of attack increase. Even if an attacker succeeds in finding a
vulnerability at one point, the vulnerability could be unavailable as the result of
shifting the underlying system, which makes the environment more resilient against
attacks.
To best apply the MTD ideas to protect web applications, there are two high-level
decisions:
• Deciding what web application component to move
• Choosing the optimal frequency of randomization of the chosen components
To assist in answering these questions, we first dissect the architecture of a modern
web application - both client and server as well as their running environments, in
order to explore the possible application of MTD at different layers. We hope our
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Presentation Layer
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Communication
Channel
Local Storage
Operating System Application 
Layer
Logic Layer
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Operating System
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HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2
Cookies, IndexedDB, 
localStorage, File API
Figure 3.1: A Modern Web Application Architecture and Its Running Environments.
analysis provides insights into the trade-offs among the different places to apply MTD
to web applications.
We also discuss our first steps in applying MTD techniques to protect web applica-
tions. The first technique changes the server-side language used in a web application
by automatically translating server-side web application code to another language in
order to prevent Code Injection exploits. The second technique shifts the database
used in a web application by transforming the backend SQL database into differ-
ent implementations that speak different dialects in order to prevent SQL Injection
exploits.
3.2 Dissecting Modern Web Applications
In order to properly understand how to apply the ideas of moving target defense to
web applications, we first describe a typical web application followed by a discussion
on the ideas behind using moving target defense. As shown in Figure 3.1, a web
application follows a distributed application structure, with components running on
both server and the client systems. When requesting a web resource, the client first
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issues a request to the server-side component over its communication channels - this
is typically the HTTP protocol and its derivative protocols such as HTTPS, SPDY,
and HTTP/2. The server receives the request and processes it using the application’s
logic and returns the requested resource. If data stored in an external database is
requested, the server passes the relevant user-input as a query and processes the
result. The server side typically includes the following layers from top to bottom 1 :
• The server-side logic layer implements the application business logic using high-
level programming languages, such as Java, PHP, or Python.
• The web server layer receives the HTTP request from the client, parses the
HTTP request, and passes the request to the appropriate server-side program.
Examples include Apache web server, Windows IIS, or Nginx.
• The data storage layer stores the web application state and user data. Popular
data storage systems are traditional SQL databases, which include MySQL,
PostgreSQL, or MSSQL.
• The operating system layer that provides the running environment for the web
server layer and database storage layer.
• The infrastructure layer that runs the operating systems. An infrastructure
could be a physical machine or a virtualization platform which manages multiple
virtual machines.
The client receives the HTTP response from the server-side component and converts
the HTML contained in the HTTP response into a graphical interface for the user.
The client consists of the following components:
1Of course, modern web application stacks can become increasingly complex, with caches, external
requests, or other services, however we restrict our discussion to this abstracted model.
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• The client-side logic layer, usually known as the presentation layer. The logic
code here is usually composed of a combination of HTML, CSS, and JavaScript,
with JavaScript providing a way for the server-side code to execute application
logic on the client.
• The browser, which retrieves the presentation layer code from the server (typi-
cally HTML), interprets it, and presents it as a graphical interface to the user.
• The storage layer, that the presentation layer code uses to store data. Available
storage methods include cookies, localStorage, IndexedDB, and File APIs.
• The operating system layer, which the browser runs on.
3.3 Current Security Issues and Considerations
Based on our proposed definition of a web application’s structure in Figure 3.1,
if a layer is compromised, the upper layers are not trustworthy. For instance, if
the server’s operating system is compromised, then the data storage, web server,
and server-side logic are also compromised due to the interconnected nature of web
applications. In addition to this, if the communication channel is also compromised
- i.e. Man in the Middle attack; the client side presentation layer also gets affected,
as attackers are able to manipulate the information being seen by users. In order
to attack a layer in Figure 3.1, adversaries often utilize interfaces exposed to the
upper layers. For instance, in a heap spraying attack executed on the client browser
layer Ratanaworabhan et al. (2009), an attacker allocates malicious objects using
JavaScript in the presentation layer in order to coerce the browser into spraying
objects in the heap, increasing the success rate of an exploit where a vulnerability is
exploited by jumping to the location within the heap. In this example, the attacker
leverages a vulnerability located in the presentation layer - lack of input validation; to
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exploit a vulnerability in the browser layer that leads to arbitrary code execution in
the browser’s address space. The arbitrary code that was injected can in turn exploit
a vulnerability found on the client operating system in order to escalate a malicious
user’s privilege and further infect the client machine. Furthermore, vulnerabilities
are not isolated within each system. For example, malicious JavaScript code could
be delivered by an attacker by exploiting a vulnerability in the server-side logic layer,
using a reflected or stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability.
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Chapter 4
MOVING TARGET DEFENSE FOR WEB APPLICATIONS
4.1 Current State of Moving Target Defense in Web Applications
Current techniques and approaches to web vulnerabilities focus on detection,
patching, and prevention. In addition to these traditional approaches, recent at-
tempts have been made to apply the moving target defense concept to web applica-
tions. Huang et al. proposed to create and rotate between a set of virtual servers,
each of which is configured with a unique software mix, to move the attack surface for
web surfaces Huang and Ghosh (2011). Their work also explored the various opportu-
nities of diversification in the web application software stack, providing a higher-level
overview of the attack surface. Our work builds on this by further analyzing the
components in each layer and defining what randomization in each layer entails; in
addition to attempting to automate diversification of the components located in the
logic and storage layer. Aiming to prevent SQL injection attacks, Boyd et al. proposed
to create instances of unpredictable database query languages and to translate them
to standard SQL using an intermediary proxy Boyd and Keromytis (2004). Although
their approach also aims to prevent SQL injections, our proposed diversification ap-
proach aims to prevent a broader range of vulnerabilities—specifically unpatched
vulnerabilities, zero day exploits, and mass-attacks targeting specific database im-
plementations. Portner et al. proposed to defend against cross-site scripting (XSS)
attacks by mutating the symbols in JavaScript in such a way that maliciously injected
JavaScript code fails to execute due to incorrect version compatibility, and identify-
ing such malicious programs Portner et al. (2014). Their work aims to prevent a
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different class of vulnerabilities, specifically located at the presentation layer on the
client side. On the other hand, our proposed approach is aimed at applying MTD
ideas on the server side of the web application architecture - specifically the logic and
storage layers. Despite these differences, we envision such techniques, located in each
layer, to cooperate together to provide a defense-in-depth approach in defending web
applications.
4.2 Leveraging web application layers for MTD
The core idea of moving target defense (MTD) can be applied to each layer of web
applications and their running components. The key consideration to ensure however,
is that the “movement,” done successfully prevents the intended vulnerability or
exploit, while preserving the application functionality. In this section, we discuss the
different components that are available for moving at each layer of the web application.
Specifically, we focus on the layers that play a major role in web applications and
those that are often targeted: the logic layer, storage layer, and presentation layer,
and browsers. For a discussion on layers that are common to other applications, which
include the operating system layer and the infrastructure layer, we refer the interested
reader to research in these areas Team (2003); Barrantes et al. (2003); Larsen et al.
(2014); Wartell et al. (2012); Williams et al. (2009); Salamat et al. (2011); Vikram
et al. (2013); Dunlop et al. (2011); Carvalho and Ford (2014); Li et al. (2014).
4.2.1 Logic Layer
At the logic layer of web applications, there exist at least two ways of applying
MTD by changing it’s implementation. The first approach is based on the idea of
software diversity Larsen et al. (2014), changing and modifying the code at state-
ment, function, or object levels. This technique is widely used in lower level lan-
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guages, and is typically used to prevent memory corruption vulnerabilities - specifi-
cally return-oriented programming (ROP) exploits, that take advantage of previously
known code-layouts by hijacking the program control flow and executing malicious
code. This automated diversity MTD technique can be done statically or dynami-
cally. Web applications however, are typically written in higher level languages such
as Java, Python, and Ruby - offering them some degree of immunity to memory cor-
ruption vulnerabilities. As a result, most vulnerabilities found in web applications
are a inherent in the code itself - for instance, XSS attacks, where server-side web
application code is able to modify or create HTML from user input that is unsanitized
and untrusted. In such a case, software diversity will be ineffective as the problem
lies within the logic of the web application.
Another possible MTD approach at the logic layer is similar to software diversifi-
cation, with the concept of extending ’diversification’ to a higher level. By switching a
web application’s implementation from one language to another, one could eliminate
some language- or framework-specific vulnerabilities, due to some vulnerability classes
being specific to certain programming languages. For instance, an application that is
developed with Ruby on Rails 3.0.5 may introduce execution-after-redirect vulnera-
bilities, while its counterpart developed with Python and Django 1.2.5 is impervious
to this class of vulnerabilities, primarily due to the different implementations of the
underlying framework Doupe´ et al. (2011). As with software diversity, changing the
web application’s implementation language could be static or dynamic. In a static
implementation language switch, the translation of the original application is done
prior to launch and allows the web server to simply launch another instance of the the
application that is written in a different implementation language. To automate the
process, web application developers need only develop the application once in their
preferred language followed by feeding their original code to a translator program to
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translate the code into functionally equivalent code in another web application lan-
guage. The process of translation between languages is difficult due to several reasons.
The primary issue being that the original language the code is written in might have
some features that the target language does not offer. In a dynamic implementation
language switch, in addition to the translation issues in the static approach, resources
must be managed properly when switching - for example, executing the translation
while managing ongoing requests and responses, as well as ensuring that the states of
the running web application is maintained or transformed in order for the program
to understand once translation is completed. In Section 5.1 we further discuss our
implementation of this automated implementation language switch idea.
4.2.2 Storage Layer
The primary challenge that the storage layer of web applications face are often
database injection attacks wherein, user data retrieved from the logic layer is inter-
preted as SQL statements by the application’s database management systems. In
order to successfully perform these SQL injection attacks, malicious users need to
carefully craft their input to overcome injection prevention techniques by utilizing
reversed tokens in the target SQL syntax and modify the logic layer’s intended SQL
statement.
While SQL itself is standard, there exist different SQL database implementations
that utilize slightly different SQL syntaxes (also called dialects). By leveraging this
information, one can switch the database implementation used in a web application
in order to defeat targeted SQL injection exploits aimed at specific SQL dialects.
For instance, when using a database that uses MySQL’s dialect, both single (’’) and
double ("") quotations are used for identifying values—on the other-hand, switching a
database that contains the same data written in PostgreSQL’s dialect results in single
27
quotations being restricted for values and double quotations used when identifying
field names, table names, etc.
Similar to the logic layer implementation randomization, static MTD for databases
can be realized by exporting the data from one database implementation prior to
execution and then importing it into a different database implementation. Dynamic
MTD for the storage layer is also possible to achieve by translating the database
at intervals and swapping the currently running instance with the target instance.
However, both databases need to be kept synchronized while allowing for continuous
external interaction. In Section 5.2 we discuss our implementation of this idea.
4.2.3 Presentation Layer
The client side presentation layer primarily contains technologies that are most
directly accessible to the user - they provide information to the browser that allows
users to view their requested resource. Some examples of technologies found in this
layer are: client-side JavaScript code running some of the web application’s logic, the
HTML DOM containing the web page layout and provides a way for users to interact
with the application through forms, radio buttons, and hyper-links, and CSS that
manages the web page style and layout. At this layer, the most direct threat to user
data is found through XSS attacks wherein malicious scripts are injected into the web
application in order to steal information from users.
Several MTD approaches have been proposed to prevent against such attacks.
One technique is to introduce a degree of randomness to the underlying HTML form
fields by adding tags to each field in order to obfuscate or hide their real values against
web bots looking to automate attacks Vikram et al. (2013). Another approach was
proposed to introduce randomness to the JavaScript code by mutating tokens in
such a way that malicious JavaScript code injected by attackers will fail to execute as
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their input does not match the version running on the application. In addition to this
random token, multiple versions of the website utilizing varying JavaScript versions
are also deployed to further confuse attackers Portner et al. (2014).
4.2.4 Browsers
Most modern web browsers have modularized architectures that typically include
rendering engines, JavaScript interpreters, and XML parsers Reis et al. (2009). By
moving and modifying these components, vulnerabilities present within the compo-
nents of the browser can also be mitigated. By doing so, the browser itself, as well as
the underlying system it is running on can be defended. For example, the Cheetah
browser and the 360 browser can change their rendering engines between WebKit and
Trident. By doing so, remote code executions and memory corruption exploits can
be prevented.
In addition to defending browsers against exploits, user privacy can also be pro-
tected by modifying browser configurations. Each browser instance has its own unique
configurations: System fonts, Browser plugins and versions, cookie enabled flags, and
user agents just to name a few. Using these information, web applications are able to
uniquely fingerprint a browser in order to track users and their web movements Ecker-
sley (2010). By diversifying the configuration components, a browser can be prevented
from being fingerprinted, thereby protecting the web user’s privacy Laperdrix et al.
(2015); Nikiforakis et al. (2015, 2013).
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Chapter 5
IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 Source Code language diversification
In order to apply the concept of MTD onto the server side logic layer, we aim to
change the underlying language implementation of the web application while ensuring
that the main functionalities and front facing interface remain unchanged. This is to
keep the idea of misleading potential attackers by hiding underlying changes while
keeping things consistent for legitimate users. We modify the source code in such a
way to prevent certain categories of vulnerabilities from being effectively exploited —
for instance, remote code injection exploits would become ineffective due to a) pay-
loads developed by an attacker would rely on information before code-manipulation,
potentially rendering them invalid; or b) malicious code that an attacker manages to
inject into the application logic would be ineffective, as again, it would rely on pre-
viously known system information. In addition, because of the method of changing
the underlying code, undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities (zero-day exploits)
present in the original language of the web application would be protected against
exploits.
We first describe our implementation of a static MTD mechanism for the logic
layer. In order to simplify the translation process, we choose to narrow down to
two languages to convert between. PHP and Python were selected as the base code
languages after sampling different open source web applications and production-ready
web applications, both widely used as web application code bases that include Google,
YouTube, Pinterest, and Bing. In order achieve a MTD system applicable to web
30
applications, we automate the process of converting a Python web application to PHP
and vice-versa. The first step to achieve this MTD system is to convert the original
source code into a syntactically valid output in the target language. In the case of our
chosen languages, to translate between PHP and Python requires further refinement
of Python web applications as there exist varying web application frameworks for
Python (Django, web2py, and Flask to name a few) while PHP remains primarily
suited for web development and web application creation. We choose to focus on
Python applications developed using cg-lib however, the translation and automation
process can be extended to other frameworks in the future.
The functionality of our translator is similar to a compiler, as such, to trans-
late from Python to PHP, we chose to leverage existing functionality as the initial
step—specifically, we utilize the built-in parsing and unparsing modules in Python
2.7 to construct an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of the input Python program. The
unparsing module creates the leaves and parsing module gets it back together. Dur-
ing this process, we were able to manipulate each leaf according to the destination
language’s grammar requirement. After feeding the web application’s code into this
parser, it creates a tree of objects representing the grammar. This tree is then sent
to the unparsing module to be reversed back in to code. This module reads the tree
and recursively calls print code to output the original code back again. The unpars-
ing module is shown in Figure 5.1 and illustrates the a function call in Python with
modulus operator. Once the AST of the original code is generated and translated,
we convert the AST back to readable Python code using Python’s unparse module
- we develop a new library based on this module to generate PHP code instead of
Python code. It is important to note that we did not modify the original intent of
these modules - to take a full parse tree and print back the equivalent source code;
instead, we simply modify the output of printing back readable source code. The core
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def Pr in t ( s e l f , t ) :
s e l f . f i l l ( ” p r i n t ” )
do comma = False
i f t . des t :
s e l f . wr i t e ( ”>>” )
s e l f . d i spatch ( t . des t )
do comma = True
for e in t . va lue s :
i f do comma : s e l f . wr i t e ( ” , ” )
else : do comma=True
s e l f . d i spatch ( e )
i f not t . n l :
s e l f . wr i t e ( ” , ” )
Listing 5.1: Original Print in unparse to generate Python code.
idea of our implementation is that the parser creates the AST and sends it to the
unparsing module and the unparsing module prints out the translated code instead
of the original code that was fed.
Figure 5.1: The Unparser
For instance, when translating a simple print statement in Python to the PHP
equivalent of echo, we modify the _Print function in the unparse module as shown
in Listing 5.1.
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def Pr in t ( s e l f , t ) :
s e l f . f i l l ( ” echo ” )
do comma = False
i f t . des t :
s e l f . wr i t e ( ”>>” )
s e l f . d i spatch ( t . des t )
do comma = True
for e in t . va lue s :
i f do comma : s e l f . wr i t e ( ” , ” )
else : do comma=True
s e l f . d i spatch ( e )
i f not t . n l :
s e l f . wr i t e ( ” , ” )
s e l f . wr i t e ( ” ; ” )
Listing 5.2: Modified Print in unparse to generate PHP code.
For this example, we replace the print Python keyword with the echo PHP
keyword and ensure that the instruction is terminated with a semicolon as shown in
Listing 5.2.
Once this step is completed, we have web application code that is in a syntactically
valid PHP form. However, it does not have the same semantics as the original Python
program nor is a semantically valid PHP application. As such, it needs to be further
modified in order to satisfy these two conditions. This modification is necessary as
there may not be a one-to-one translation of every feature from Python to PHP
or vice-versa. To illustrate this problem, suppose we have a Python instruction to
terminate and exit the program using the following code snippet:
sys . e x i t (0 )
Once the initial syntactic translation is completed and a valid PHP output is gener-
ated, we have the following:
sys−>exit ( 0 ) ;
This is now valid PHP code as it uses the correct notation for function calls and is
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<?php
c l a s s sys {
pub l i c s t a t i c func t i on exit Wrapper PHP ($command){
exit ($command ) ;
}
}
?>
Listing 5.3: sys class in PHP
correctly terminated with a semicolon. However, when executed, PHP sees this line of
code as a call to some sys object with an call to an internal function exit(0), which
does not exist in PHP by default. The Python sys.exit(0) function call however
does have a direct equivalent in PHP—the exit($status) function. We therefore
leverage these direct equivalent function calls by implementing them as code shims
in order to match the new function calls. To this end, because the syntax of the code
is known to us after the initial translation is completed, we develop a PHP library
that contains an object called sys with a function call to exit(status) as shown in
Listing 5.3. This PHP library shim can be included in the translated application in
order for the function call to remain semantically valid.
Shims Most, if not all programming languages include libraries that contain
predefined functions that are called whenever a specific function call is used. When
translated using our method, the target language will often have different libraries and
corresponding functions to the original language; causing a mismatch in functionality
in the syntactically matched output. Furthermore, developers have the capability to
create and use custom libraries in addition to the standard, predefined ones - some
overwriting/overloading the default functions. In such cases, these custom functions
must be investigated thoroughly and the translator adjusted in order to ensure similar
functionality to the original application intent.
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One solution to this problem is to create shims for each of these predefined or
custom functions. As described above, shims are simply custom-built libraries that
have the ability to behave as if it is the library that was originally called by the
application without affecting the flow of the application. For our implementation,
we have created several PHP and Python shims that emulate built-in and developer-
specified functions and libraries in the target language. Some samples of shims that we
have implemented are: a CGI shim that allows the ability to emulate the CGI module
from Python in PHP, a Time shim which allows the use of Python localtime()
function in PHP and return an array of time variables in the order of Python’s
localtime().
The creation of these shims can be extended to include other popular libraries;
for instance, MySQLdb is a Python specified library for MySQL functionality that
is required to be imported within the application code. Once the application is run
through he syntactic converter, this library needs to call predefined PHP MySQL
functions as a shim in order to ensure similar functionality to the original Python
application. Some example MySQLdb functions that were translated and shimmed
are connect, used to connect to the database and rowcount, used to display number
of affected rows.
Context-Sensitive Approach As mentioned previously, simply translating be-
tween languages is not enough due to differing syntax and semantics. Furthermore,
data structure differences between PHP and Python require specific handling of code
based on its context - so called context- sensitive translations. One such in-
stance is the use of the % operand in Python in order to perform string formatting.
This operand can take different types of variables as input; once converted however,
there is no direct counterpart in PHP. In order to handle the multi-variable ability of
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the Python operation, the tool should be able to detect if such an operation is called
and modify the Python code to output PHP code that handles the specific operation
in that line.
Using this approach, we recursively run the tool on the Python functions that
the original program calls, and convert them as well. If, for instance, the original
program is written in C, we must create the equivalent function for that code in the
target language.
5.2 Database dialect diversification
To enable the MTD concept in the server side storage layer, we propose to use the
same method done in the logic layer by modifying the underlying database dialect of
the web application. An integral part of this methodology is to ensure that at any
time during this movement mechanism, the integrity and availability of data is pre-
served. Using this randomization technique, we anticipate that certain vulnerability
and exploit categories will be rendered ineffective—specifically, we seek to protect
against SQL injection exploits by leveraging the syntactical differences between var-
ious SQL dialect. By translating between different database dialects, the system
could be potentially protected against database-specific exploits as well as unpatched
or undiscovered vulnerabilities by rendering the information an attacker has about
the system invalid due to differing web application configurations. We have identified
two considerations to be made when performing the database translations:
• No alterations must be made to the data content —that is, at the end of the
translation process, end-users must be able to see the same information stored
regardless of the underlying database dialect.
• Access to the database and the data stored within must be available anytime
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the application logic issues a request while keeping the translation process trans-
parent to the user.
These two properties ensure that the web application service is undisturbed and the
MTD mechanism is hidden to malicious users.
Similar to our source language translation methodology, we refine the selections of
database dialects to two widely popular database dialects, MySQL and PostgreSQL.
These two were chosen due to their high popularity rankings and the large enough
differences in syntax - anticipating them to be the target of wide-spread database
exploits. In addition, both dialects are used by well known entities as their back-end
- Facebook, Google, Amazon, U.S. Dept of labor, U.S. State Department, and Sun
Microsystemsto name a few.
As previously mentioned, we want to leverage the syntactical differences between
SQL dialects in our MTD mechanism. In particular, some of the differences between
MySQL and PostgreSQL syntaxes that we are interested in leveraging include the
following:
• When starting comments in MySQL, the # or -- (A space after the -- is re-
quired) is utilized. On the other hand, to begin a comment in PostgreSQL, the
-- (the space is not required) is used.
• To identify values in MySQL, the single (’’) quotes or double ("") quotes are
used. When using PostgreSQL, single (’’) quotes are used in identifying values
while double ("") quotes are reserved in identifying field names, table names,
etc.
• When doing string comparisons in MySQL, case-sensitivity is not taken into
consideration. However, when string comparison is done in PostgreSQL, they
are done in a case-sensitive manner, i.e. john != JOHN != John.
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Each one of these syntax differences affect the SQL injection payloads written
in order to take advantage of a web application’s SQL injection vulnerability. If an
attacker assumes that the web application is using a particular database backend;
for instance, if the attacker scans the entire web for web applications that utilize a
specific version of MySQL that has a injection exploit using their value identification
method, changing the dialect to PostgreSQL will cause the MySQL payload to fail.
Similar to the source code language diversification approach, we choose to develop
a tool that can automate the conversion or translation between database dialects. In
order to convert from PostgreSQL to MySQL, we modified an existing open-source
tool created by Lightbox that originally functions to convert PostgreSQL to MySQL—
although we are able to simply create a database dump from PostgreSQL, using the
resulting code is insufficient as there are still differences between the database syn-
taxes and data types that must be resolved. In order to acquire the initial database
dump, specific run-time options must be enabled when dumping the database. Post-
greSQL database dumps need to created while enabling insert statements by using
the --inserts flag enabled to properly include the data stored while MySQL needs to
have the --compatible=postgresql flag to properly include PostgreSQL keywords
in the output file. To resolve the syntax mismatch during translation, we modify
the code to process the original database dump by parsing through the input file
(the source database dump) and replacing any PostgreSQL keywords and data-types
into corresponding MySQL keywords and data types. In translating between different
database data types, some considerations need to be made. For instance PostgreSQL’s
BYTEA can be equivalent to any of the MySQL data types shown in Table 5.1. When
choosing what data type to convert to, it needs to be generic enough in such a way
that it covers the possible data value found in the original database, while attempting
to be as performant as possible. To handle conversion in the reverse direction, from
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MySQL PostgreSQL
BINARY(n) BYTEA
VARBINARY(n) BYTEA
TINYBLOB BYTEA
BLOB BYTEA
MEDIUMBLOB BYTEA
LONGBLOB BYTEA
Table 5.1: Comparison of MySQL and PostgreSQL Data Types.
MySQL to PostgreSQL, we simply re-purposed the code by reversing the process—
that is, we parse through the dump file looking for MySQL keywords and data-types
converting them to the corresponding PostgreSQL keywords and data-types. Similar
to translating the language constructs of a web application, database translations
may be costly as well depending on the size and complexity of the database—for in-
stance optimizations done on the original implementation of the database will become
invalid once converted.
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Chapter 6
EVALUATION AND RESULTS
6.1 Application Functionality
In order to ensure system availability is preserved through the translation process,
we compare the application functions to ensure that the same input returns the same
output before and after the translation. In order to accurately quantify the results, we
utilize Selenium to automate to the testing process. First, manual navigation of the
web application is done in order to keep track of the main application functionality. In
addition, this step also keeps track of the actions and input a regular user must take in
order to complete each function as well as identifying the input form field names that
is used on each page in the test automation process. Once a test suite is completed
for the original application functions, the MTD technique proceeds to translate it into
other target language - at this point, the underlying language has changed but the
front-end of the application remains unchanged to users. The selenium test suite is run
on this translated application using the same input as before; application functionality
is preserved if the resulting output is similar to the output before translation. The
MTD technique should be transparent to legitimate users, meaning the output should
be the same to them no matter what. The results for the basic functionality of the
collab application is show in Figure 6.1. Pre-translation output is done using the
original configuration of the web application that uses Python and MySQL as the
backend while post-translation output is shown using PHP and MySQL.
Results show that translating the web application leaves the interface unchanged
to the user. Functionality is kept consistent through the use of code shims as illus-
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Figure 6.1: Application functionality results of collab web application
trated by having the same output before and after changing the underlying language
of the web application using the same input.
6.2 Translation and Randomization cost overhead
To measure translation time overhead, a simple timer is used in the script when a
configuration change starts and ends. For example, when a database change is invoked
a timer starts in the script prior to calling the database translator and stops when
the translation is done. This isolates the translation of each configuration change
during each ’movement’. The measurements were taken using virtual machines from
Oracle VirtualBox 5.1.18, four instances each running a unique configuration of the
web application source language and database dialect on Ubuntu 12.04.5 with 1GB
of memory. The combination for each system is as follows:
• 192.168.1.101 : PHP/MySQL
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• 192.168.1.102 : PHP/PostgreSQL
• 192.168.1.103 : Python/MySQL
• 192.168.1.104 : Python/PostgreSQL
In addition, a fifth virtual machine was also set up to handle the request routing
to the appropriate application configuration as well as handle the database of the
application.
Figure 6.2 shows the average time it takes to completely change configuration from
one variant to another. Similar colored cells signify that the configuration change is
identical with the following colors corresponding to the configuration change - pink:
same source language, differing database dialect, orange: differing source language,
same database dialect, and green: differing source language and differing database
dialect. Three data-sets were collected that differ in how long each test were run.
Figure 6.2: Average time of changing configurations
Figure6.3 shows the various translation times between each MTD variants among
all three datasets: database-only variants, source-code only variants, and database
and source code variants.
Several data points appear further from the average translation times due to
hardware issues while running the experiment, the virtual machines were running on
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Figure 6.3: Translation time between all MTD variants
an unused laptop running an i7-4710 and 8GB of RAM. A closer view of the data set
of one configuration translated to the other two is found in Figure6.4
Figure 6.4: Translation from one configuration to two other configurations (Same
language, different database dialect and different language, same database dialect)
From the data collected, it would seem that changing database configurations take
less time than changing source language configurations. This can be attributed to
the complexity in rebuilding the source-code to match the target language - most
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languages are inherently different in code structure and semantics, requiring line by
line translation to achieve the correct output. Database translation on the other hand
is simpler as our chosen dialects both follow the ANSI/ISO SQL standard - the largest
difference being differences in syntax rather than semantics.
6.3 Security Evaluation
To evaluate the security benefits of our MTD technique, we simply run the orig-
inal application using a malicious payload to verify that the vulnerability is present
and run the same payload after changing the configuration to verify that the MTD
technique renders the payload invalid.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I explored the feasibility of applying MTD concepts to web applica-
tions in order to introduce another layer of defense. A study was done on existing
MTD techniques to identify the components and considerations in MTD. Using this
knowledge, an analysis of the modern web application stack was done in order to
understand how and where MTD can be applied. I developed an automated tool that
assists in translating between source-code languages and database dialects in order
to mitigate several classes of web application vulnerabilities. Current results show
that employing the proposed MTD technique can defend against specified exploits
when an exploit is launched enmasse against a specific technology (ex. mass attacks
against postgres database web applications). When used to defend against targeted
attacks, the MTD technique may not be as effective, as malicious users can even-
tually discover the simplistic configuration change pattern.However, implementing
the source or database randomization with other MTD techniques such as network
randomization can introduce another layer of complexity that an attacker must go
through. The automated tool introduced can be extended to apply to any source
language - however, the number of shims that need to be developed in order to have
semantically equivalent web application may be take considerable amount of time
as each application could potentially contain multiple custom functions. Providing
a central repository for these code shims may reduce the amount of code repetition
needed, this solution is infeasible however as having a public collection of these shims
also enables easy access to malicious users. Further work is needed to develop a more
generalized method of translating between languages in a more effective manner.
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APPENDIX A
RAW DATA
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−−
−− PostgreSQL database dump
−−
SET s tatement t imeout = 0 ;
SET l o ck t imeout = 0 ;
SET c l i e n t e n c od i n g = ’UTF8 ’ ;
SET s t anda rd con f o rm ing s t r i ng s = on ;
SET ch e ck func t i on bod i e s = fa l se ;
SET c l i en t min mes sage s = warning ;
DROP DATABASE te s t da t aba s e ;
−−
−− Name: t e s t d a t a b a s e ; Type : DATABASE; Schema : −; Owner : po s t g r e s
−−
CREATE DATABASE te s t da t aba s e WITH TEMPLATE = template0 ENCODING = ’UTF8 ’ LC COLLATE
= ’ Engl i sh United Sta t e s .1252 ’ LC CTYPE = ’ Eng l i sh United Sta t e s .1252 ’ ;
ALTER DATABASE te s t da t aba s e OWNER TO pos tg r e s ;
\connect t e s t da t aba s e
SET s tatement t imeout = 0 ;
SET l o ck t imeout = 0 ;
SET c l i e n t e n c od i n g = ’UTF8 ’ ;
SET s t anda rd con f o rm ing s t r i ng s = on ;
SET ch e ck func t i on bod i e s = fa l se ;
SET c l i en t min mes sage s = warning ;
−−
−− Name: pu b l i c ; Type : SCHEMA; Schema : −; Owner : po s t g r e s
−−
CREATE SCHEMA pub l i c ;
ALTER SCHEMA pub l i c OWNER TO pos tg r e s ;
−−
−− Name: SCHEMA pub l i c ; Type : COMMENT; Schema : −; Owner : po s t g r e s
−−
COMMENTON SCHEMA pub l i c IS ’ standard pub l i c schema ’ ;
−−
−− Name: p l p g s q l ; Type : EXTENSION; Schema : −; Owner :
−−
CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS p lpg sq l WITH SCHEMA pg ca ta l og ;
−−
−− Name: EXTENSION p l p g s q l ; Type : COMMENT; Schema : −; Owner :
−−
COMMENTON EXTENSION p lpg sq l IS ’PL/pgSQL procedura l language ’ ;
SET s earch path = publ ic , pg ca ta l og ;
SET d e f a u l t t a b l e s p a c e = ’ ’ ;
SET d e f a u l t w i t h o i d s = fa l se ;
−−
−− Name: t e s t t a b l e ; Type : TABLE; Schema : pu b l i c ; Owner : po s t g r e s ; Tablespace :
−−
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CREATE TABLE t e s t t a b l e (
username character varying (15) NOT NULL,
password character varying (15) NOT NULL,
creditnumber numeric (10 ,0 )
) ;
ALTER TABLE t e s t t a b l e OWNER TO pos tg r e s ;
−−
−− Data fo r Name: t e s t t a b l e ; Type : TABLE DATA; Schema : pu b l i c ; Owner : po s t g r e s
−−
INSERT INTO t e s t t a b l e VALUES ( ’ user1 ’ , ’ t e s t p a s s ’ , 60547381) ;
INSERT INTO t e s t t a b l e VALUES ( ’ user2 ’ , ’ pass ’ , 72619472) ;
INSERT INTO t e s t t a b l e VALUES ( ’ user3 ’ , ’ pas spass ’ , 81124561) ;
INSERT INTO t e s t t a b l e VALUES ( ’ user4 ’ , ’ passwordpass ’ , 5522698) ;
−−
−− Name: username ; Type : CONSTRAINT; Schema : pu b l i c ; Owner : po s t g r e s ; Tablespace :
−−
ALTER TABLE ONLY t e s t t a b l e
ADDCONSTRAINT username PRIMARYKEY ( username ) ;
−−
−− Name: pu b l i c ; Type : ACL; Schema : −; Owner : po s t g r e s
−−
REVOKE ALL ON SCHEMA pub l i c FROM PUBLIC;
REVOKE ALL ON SCHEMA pub l i c FROM pos tg r e s ;
GRANT ALL ON SCHEMA pub l i c TO pos tg r e s ;
GRANT ALL ON SCHEMA pub l i c TO PUBLIC;
−−
−− PostgreSQL database dump complete
−−
Listing A.1: Pre-conversion PostgreSQL Database Dump
# Converted with mysql2pg−1.9
# Converted on Wed, 01 Jul 2015 23 : 58 : 23 +0000
# Lightbox Techno log ie s Inc . http ://www. l i gh tbox . ca
SET SQLMODE=”NO AUTO VALUE ON ZERO” ;
SET t ime zone=”+00:00” ;
DROP DATABASE te s t da t aba s e ;
CREATE DATABASE ‘ t e s t da tabase ‘ DEFAULTCHARACTER SET UTF8;
USE ‘ t e s t da tabase ‘ ;
CREATE TABLE t e s t t a b l e (
username varchar (15) NOT NULL,
password varchar (15) NOT NULL,
creditnumber numeric (10 ,0 )
) ENGINE=MyISAM;
INSERT INTO t e s t t a b l e VALUES ( ’ user1 ’ , ’ t e s t p a s s ’ , 60547381) ;
INSERT INTO t e s t t a b l e VALUES ( ’ user2 ’ , ’ pass ’ , 72619472) ;
INSERT INTO t e s t t a b l e VALUES ( ’ user3 ’ , ’ pas spass ’ , 81124561) ;
INSERT INTO t e s t t a b l e VALUES ( ’ user4 ’ , ’ passwordpass ’ , 5522698) ;
ALTER TABLE t e s t t a b l e
ADDCONSTRAINT username PRIMARYKEY ( username ) ;
Listing A.2: Post-conversion MySQL Database Dump
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Figure A.1: PHP and PostgreSQL translated to Python and MySQL
Figure A.2: PHP to Python translation with MySQL
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Figure A.3: Python and MySQL translated to PHP and PostgreSQL
Figure A.4: MySQL to PostgreSQL translation with Python
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Figure A.5: Python and PostgreSQL translated to PHP and MySQL
Figure A.6: Python to PHP translation with PostgreSQL
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Figure A.7: PostgreSQL to MySQL Translation with Python
Figure A.8: Step one of uploading notes
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Figure A.9: Step two of uploading notes
Figure A.10: Step three of uploading notes
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Figure A.11: Step four of uploading notes
Figure A.12: Uploading note functionality post translation
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